




Friday evening earnings news travel slowly 
Diogo Fortunato 
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) hypothesize that Friday earnings announcements receive less 
attention than comparable earnings announcements on Monday through Thursday, presumably 
because market participants are distracted from work-related activities with the weekend 
approaching (Friday Distraction Hypothesis). The holistic approach developed throughout this 
study, addresses the main weakness in their research, the negligence of the after-hours 
adjustment, showing that the well-documented differential market reaction to Friday earnings 
news is, in fact, a phenomenon only present in evening announcements. Friday evening 
announcements are associated with a substantial reduced immediate reaction to both positive 
and negative earnings news relative to other weekdays’ evening announcements. In the 
following weeks, Friday evening announcements are the only ones contributing to the delayed 
overreaction to negative news. After controlling for other possible determinants of the Friday 
evening effect, there is striking evidence indicating that this effect is driven by non-attention 
causes, being largely attributed to firm heterogeneity. The Friday Distraction Hypothesis 
defended by DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) does not hold. 
Keywords: Friday evening announcements, after-hours adjustment, firm heterogeneity. 
 
Resumo 
Anúncios de resultados pós-fecho de mercado viajam mais lentamente 
Diogo Fortunato 
DellaVigna e Pollet (2009) levantam a hipótese de que resultados anunciados à sexta-feira 
recebem menos atenção do que resultados anunciados noutros dias da semana, 
presumivelmente porque os participantes de mercado estão mais distraídos das atividades 
relacionadas com o trabalho, com a aproximação do fim-de-semana (Hipótese de Distração à 
sexta-feira). A abordagem holística desenvolvida ao longo deste estudo, tem em consideração 
a maior limitação do seu estudo, a negligência do ajustamento pós-fecho de mercado, 
mostrando que a bem documentada reação diferencial do mercado a anúncios de resultados à 
sexta-feira é um fenómeno apenas presente em anúncios de resultados pós-fecho de mercado. 
Anúncios de resultados à sexta-feira pós-fecho de mercado estão associados com uma reação 
imediata substancialmente reduzida tanto para boas notícias como para más notícias, 
comparativamente com anúncios feitos noutro dia da semana depois do mercado fechar. Nas 
semanas seguintes, anúncios feitos à sexta-feira pós-fecho de mercado são os únicos que 
contribuem para a reação atrasada do mercado a notícias negativas anunciadas à sexta-feira. 
Depois de controlados outros possíveis determinantes deste efeito, evidências apontam para que 
este seja atribuído em grande parte à heterogeneidade entre empresas, exceto no que diz respeito 
à reação imediata substancialmente reduzida a notícias negativas. A Hipótese de Distração à 
sexta-feira defendida por DellaVigna e Pollet (2009) não se verifica. 
Palavras-chave: Anúncios de resultados à sexta-feira pós-fecho de mercado, ajustamento pós-
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1. Introduction  
This study contributes to the field of research investigating the differential market response to 
Friday earnings announcements relative to other weekdays’ announcements, both in the 
immediate aftermath of an announcement and on the following weeks. The motivation for this 
thesis comes from DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) research, which suggest that Friday earnings 
information is not readily incorporated into stock prices, possibly due to weekend-induced 
distraction. Their findings give rise to what will be called from this point on, the Friday 
Distraction Hypothesis. For the results to be consistent with this hypothesis, there are two 
necessary conditions. If, indeed, market participants are presumably distracted from work-
related activities with the weekend approaching, the immediate market response to Friday 
earnings announcements should be flatter relative to other weekday’s earnings announcements 
(Immediate Under-Reaction Sub-Hypothesis). In the post-announcement period, investors 
might only become aware of the neglected information when they receive new information 
about the firm (e.g. next earnings news about the same firm). With this new piece of 
information, investors will probably revisit their past investment decisions regarding that 
particular firm, and realize that they under-reacted. Following that, the immediate under-
reaction is expected to be corrected gradually, with prices drifting in the direction of the 
earnings surprise as the neglected news information gets slowly incorporated into stock prices 
(Delayed Overreaction Sub-Hypothesis)1. Additionally, a low level of trading volume in 
response to Friday news also corroborates this hypothesis.  
More than reproducing DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) results, it is addressed the main weakness 
in their study, which has to do with the negligence of the after-hours adjustment. Event dating 
accuracy is crucial for this type of study, since the focus is in the short-run market response to 
Friday earnings announcements. An error of one day in the imputed event date has the potential 
to completely distrust the results. For this reason, it is essential to adjust the event-day 0 for 
after-hours announcements, increasing the precision of the indicator that measures stock return 
and volume responses in the immediate aftermath of an earnings announcement.  
This study contributes to the aforementioned field of research, evaluating the robustness of the 
Friday effect for more recent data, including the 2008 global financial crisis and the post-crisis 
                                                 
1 Previous research provides evidence indicating that relevant earnings information can be neglected at the time of 
the announcement, leading the market to react later to previously released news (Ho & Michaely, 1988; Huberman 
& Regev, 2001). 
7 
 
period (caused by the collapse of the housing bubble). In this way, it is provided useful 
information for arbitrageurs aiming at exploring this anomaly.  
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2, presents the review of relevant literature for the 
research conducted in this study. Chapter 3, presents sample selection criteria, data sources, 
methodology, and descriptive statistics by weekday. In chapter 4, the DellaVigna and Pollet’s 
(2009) methodology is replicated to test the Friday Distraction Hypothesis, from January 1995 
to September 2014. In chapter 5, the robustness of this hypothesis is further analyzed, enhancing 
the quality of the methodology applied, by adjusting the event-day 0 for after-hours 
announcements. Furthermore, it is performed a segmented analysis of the Friday effect for each 
time-of-the-day interval, for earnings announced between January 1999 and September 2014. 
Also in this chapter, a regression analysis is performed to confirm or disprove a widely held 
belief that managers tend to report bad news on Fridays, after-market-close and on busy 
reporting days. Lastly, chapter 6 presents the main conclusions of this study.  
2. Literature Review 
In theory, rational investors are expected to timely incorporate into stock prices all the set of 
public information available, especially, information regarding attention-grabbing events such 
as earnings announcements. However, there is a well-documented tendency for a stock’s 
cumulative abnormal return to drift for several weeks in the direction of the earnings surprise, 
following an earnings announcement, widely known as the post-earnings announcement drift 
anomaly. Even Eugene Fama, known as the father of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, describes 
the post-earnings announcement drift as “an anomaly above suspicion” (Fama, 1998). 
Inconsistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis, there is ample empirical evidence of the 
delayed incorporation of relevant earnings-related information into stock prices. This anomaly, 
also known as earnings momentum, was first introduced into literature by Ball and Brown 
(1968). Later, Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984) report that a strategy composed of a long 
position in extreme positive earnings surprises combined with a short position in extreme 
negative earnings surprises, yields an average spread return of 6.32%, over the 60 trading days 
following the announcement date (Bernard & Thomas, 1989). The magnitude of the spread 
varies with firm size (8.34% for small firms and 3.6% for large firms). Additionally, Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) investigate the profitability of rolling investment strategies 
exploiting this anomaly.  
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The well-documented immediate under-reaction following earnings announcements is the most 
widely accepted explanation for the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly. The reasons 
behind this immediate under-reaction have been studied throughout the years. The inability of 
the market to readily incorporate into stock prices the earnings information about the future 
profitability of the announcer is probably the most striking evidence of under-reaction in stock 
markets. According to Frazzini (2006), irrational trading by disposition investors, can be a 
source of immediate price under-reaction to earnings announcement news, leading to return 
predictability and post-earnings announcement drift. The disposition effect, introduced into 
literature by Shefrin and Statman (1985), is the tendency for individual investors to hold losing 
stocks too long, and sell winning stocks too early. A combination of prospect theory and mental 
accounting tends to generate this effect. For instance, when a company discloses good earnings 
news, experiencing an appreciation in share value, these investors tend to sell the stock to lock 
in the immediate profit, which reduces the price. From that lower price, the post-announcement 
returns will be substantially higher (positive post-announcement drift). Conversely, when bad 
news are released into the market, disposition investors hold on to their losses, leaving the stock 
temporarily overpriced. From that higher price, the post-announcement returns will be lower 
(negative post-announcement drift).  
However, the most common explanation is related with market attention. An extensive body of 
psychological literature shows that there is a limit to the central cognitive-processing ability of 
the human mind, which is known to economists as "bounded rationality", a theory developed 
by psychologist Herbert Simon. Minds are finite, thus, when investors try to process multiple 
sources of information, or perform numerous tasks at the same time, attention must be allocated 
selectively. The investor’s ability to process earnings-related information and fully comprehend 
its implications for the company’s future profitability, is bounded by cognitive limits, and can 
be reduced by peripheral events that draw attention away from the essential, what is commonly 
referred to as market inattention. Therefore, it is theorized in recent behavioral literature that 
limited attention among investors can cause an initial market under-reaction to earnings 
information, and thereby generate return continuation, as the news information gets gradually 
incorporated into stock prices, widely known as the post-earnings announcement drift (delayed 
overreaction2). An extensive body of literature presents attention-based explanations for this 
                                                 
2 Existing behavioral theories usually suggest that overreaction is caused by biases in the investors’ ability to 




puzzling immediate market under-reaction to earnings news, stating that the market is less 
informationally efficient at certain periods: Fridays, after-market-close, busy days (how many 
competing announcements there are on a given day), among others. For the purpose of this 
research, the emphasis will be on past literature addressing the differential market reaction to 
Friday earnings announcements relative to other weekdays’ announcements, presumably due 
to weekend-induced distraction.  
Patell and Wolfson (1982), were the first to note that good earnings news are more likely to be 
reported when markets are open for trading, whereas bad earnings news are announced more 
frequently after the close of trading (Gennotte & Trueman, 1996). Furthermore, they also find 
a strong propensity for firms to announce bad earnings news on Fridays, consistent with the 
pre-conceived market perception that investors are distracted just before the weekend (Penman, 
19873; Bagnoli, Clement, & Watts, 2005). And more than that, Friday evenings (after the close 
of trading), are generally the carriers of even worse news (Damodaran, 1989). This behavior is 
consistent with the “old corporate trick” of disclosing bad earnings news on a Friday Evening, 
with the intention that it gets lost by Monday morning, attenuating the expected negative market 
impact. In the end, Patell and Wolfson (1982) provide two alternative explanations for the 
predominance of bad news releases after-hours and on Fridays. Firstly, managers can 
opportunistically announce bad earnings news on these periods to take advantage of the 
increased market inattention and reduced media coverage, thus mitigating the associated 
negative market reaction (Opportunism Hypothesis4). Secondly, they can simply be providing 
the market with more time to process and assimilate the earnings information, reaching a greater 
share of the market participants before trading resumes, which can be interpreted as a service 
to the investor community, rather than an attempt to hide bad news (Assimilation Hypothesis5).  
More recently, in line with the above-mentioned body of literature, DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2009) hypothesize that investors are distracted before the weekend and, as a result, Friday 
earnings announcements receive less attention than comparable earnings announcements from 
Monday to Thursday. Using return and volume as proxies for market attention, DellaVigna and 
Pollet (2009), find lower earnings response coefficients (15% lower immediate response), 
                                                 
3 Penman (1987) documents that managers tend to disclose more bad news on Mondays and Fridays than on any 
other weekday. 
4 Also defended by Penman (1987) and Damodaran (1989). 
5 After controlling for firms that consistently report at the same time, Doyle and Magilke (2009) find evidence that 
more complex firms tend to report earnings after-hours, to provide the market with more time to assimilate the 
complexity of its results (Bagnoli, Clement, & Watts, 2005). 
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higher post-earnings announcement drift (70% higher delayed response), and lower trading 
volume (8% lower) on Fridays than on other weekdays, consistent with lower attention on 
Fridays.  
The aforementioned body of literature provides the foundations for the fundamental research 
question addressed in this study: Do stock prices behave differently around Friday earnings 
announcements compared to other weekdays’ announcements, consistent with the Friday 
Distraction Hypothesis?  
Other authors have suggested additional situations in which investor inattention is a source of 
under-reaction to firm-related news. Recent research developed by Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh 
(2009), presents evidence of lower earnings response coefficients and greater post-earnings 
announcement drift on days with abundant earnings announcements, indicating that there is 
lower market attention on busy reporting days. Logically, if there is a considerable number of 
competing earnings announcements scheduled for a given day, the amount of attention 
dedicated to each individual firm announcement should be lower. Limited attention is also a 
source of under-reaction to firm-related news in down market periods (Hou, Peng, & Xiong, 
2008), low trading volume stocks (Hou, Peng, & Xiong, 2008), Easter week (Pantzalis & Ucar, 
2014), and summer doldrums (Gaynor & Morton, 2013).  
Similarly to DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), throughout this study, return and volume are used 
as proxies for investor attention, although aware of its limitations. Deducing a causal 
relationship between investor attention and stock return responses (volume responses), entails 
debatable assumptions about the earnings–return (earnings-volume) relation, as well as, that the 
many other identified determinants of the market response to earnings releases are effectively 
controlled in empirical investigation. Further research in this field is warranted to shed light on 
the determinants of investor attention, as the behavioral finance and psychology literature still 
do not entirely understand it6. 
3. Methodology and Statistics Analysis 
3.1. Sample Selection, Data Sources and Methodology 
The sources of data are CRSP, I/B/E/S and COMPUSTAT databases. Stock prices and share 
volume are obtained from CRSP daily stock file and merged with quarterly earnings data in 
                                                 
6 Recently, DeHaan, Shevlin and Thornock (2015) innovate using a measure of attention that does not rely on 
assumptions of market equilibrium. 
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I/B/E/S, from January 1995 to September 2014. Earnings announcement dates and actual 
earnings announced are gathered from the I/B/E/S actuals file, while forecasts are obtained from 
the I/B/E/S detail file. The sample was constrained to announcements that have stock price and 
share volume data in CRSP, are reported in both I/B/E/S and COMPUSTAT databases with a 
difference in reported announcement dates of at most 5 calendar days, and have at least one 
analyst forecast in I/B/E/S during the 30 calendar days preceding the announcement. The 
resulting sample is composed of 178,981 observations. Earnings announcement dates from 
I/B/E/S are compared with the report date of quarterly earnings (RDQ) from the COMPUSTAT 
North America Fundamentals Quarterly file, to ensure maximum accuracy of the announcement 
date considered. It is followed the newswire study presented in DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), 
which suggests three rules of optimal announcement date imputation7. In this case, only two 
were considered, given the sample period in analysis (1995-2014). On the one hand, if I/B/E/S 
and COMPUSTAT announcement dates disagree, the announcement date is set to be the earlier 
one (normally the later date is the date of publication in the Wall Street Journal). On the other 
hand, if I/B/E/S and COMPUSTAT announcement dates agree, it usually means that the 
announcement date is from a newswire source, so the announcement date is set to be the I/B/E/S 
and COMPUSTAT date (rule applicable to announcement dates after January 1, 1990).  
The earnings consensus forecast (proxy for investors’ expectations) is defined as the median of 
all analysts’ forecasts made during the 30 calendar days prior to the announcement. The 
earnings surprise measure is defined as the difference between the actual earnings announced 
and the earnings consensus forecast, divided by the stock price 5 trading days prior to the 




,  (1) 
where 𝑒𝑖,𝑞 is the earnings per share announced by firm 𝑖 in quarter 𝑞, ?̂?𝑖,𝑞 is the matching 
consensus analyst forecast and 𝑃𝑖,𝑞 is the price for firm 𝑖, 5 trading days before the 
announcement date in quarter 𝑞. I/B/E/S earnings data per share reflects capital structure 
changes (adjusted for stock splits), while CRSP stock prices are unadjusted prices. This implies 
that I/B/E/S historical data is displayed on the same share basis as current data. The same does 
not apply to CRSP data. In order to make I/B/E/S (adjusted) and CRSP (unadjusted) data 
                                                 




comparable, the cumulative split factor from the adjustments file is used to “unsplit” I/B/E/S 
actuals and forecasts. The split factor is stored as a truncated number (resulting variables have 
fractional cents), so the earnings per share 𝑒𝑖,𝑞 is rounded to the nearest cent, and the earnings 
forecast ?̂?𝑖,𝑞 to the nearest half cent.  
Following an event study methodology, after merging stock returns and trading volume from 
CRSP with earnings data from I/B/E/S, abnormal returns are computed by subtracting normal 
returns from actual returns. Normal returns for firm 𝑖 in quarter 𝑞 are calculated, using the 
parameters estimated by the following market model regression for days 𝑢, from 𝑡-300 to 𝑡-46 
(estimation window), where 𝑡 is the announcement date (event-day 0) in quarter 𝑞,  
𝑅𝑢,𝑖  =  𝛼𝑖,𝑞 +  𝛽𝑖,𝑞𝑅𝑢,𝑚  (2) 




𝑡+𝐻  (1 +  𝑅𝑗,𝑖)] − 1 − [?̂?𝑞,𝑖 + ?̂?𝑞,𝑖[Π𝑗=𝑡+ℎ
𝑡+𝐻  (1 +  𝑅𝑗,𝑚) − 1]]  (3) 
Announcements made on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays are excluded from the sample (430 
observations), as well as, announcements in which the return time-series of the corresponding 
announcing firm is not complete, for the (𝑡-300, 𝑡-46) and (𝑡, 𝑡+70) return windows (13,563 
observations). Additionally, observations with no return entry for the announcement date in the 
return time-series of the corresponding announcing firm are dropped (3,171 observations). 
Observations in which the actual earnings announced, 𝑒𝑖,𝑞, or the earnings consensus forecast, 
?̂?𝑖,𝑞, is larger, in absolute value, than the share price, 𝑃𝑖,𝑞, are also disregarded (215 
observations) to minimize possible data errors. Finally, observations in the top and bottom 
0.05% of both 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑞
(0,1) and 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑞
(2,70) distributions are dropped, to control for outliers (317 
observations).  
3.2. Descriptive Statistics: Day of the Week 
Table I presents descriptive statistics for Friday and non-Friday announcements. In Table I-A, 
consistent with previous studies, only 5.9% of the announcements occur on Friday, being the 
weekday with less volume of announcements by a large margin (e.g. Damodaran, 1989; 
DellaVigna & Pollet, 2009). This result corroborates the idea that Friday is perceived to be the 
weekday when investors are more susceptible to be distracted, discouraging firms from 
announcing on this day. The remaining announcements are mainly concentrated on Tuesday, 
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Wednesday and Thursday (81% of the announcements), leaving Monday with only 13.1% of 
the announcements. The fact that Monday is the second weekday with less volume of 
announcements can be explained by the Monday effect, anomaly reported in past literature 
consistently finding negative returns Monday (Damodaran, 1989), which can also discourage 
firms to schedule announcements on this day. Table I-B presents the difference between Friday 
and non-Friday announcements for the baseline (columns 1, 2 and 3) and homogeneous 
(columns 4, 5 and 6) samples. The homogeneous sample8 contains announcements of firms that 
announce at least 10% of the time on Friday and other weekdays. This approach excludes 
announcements made by firms that almost always announce on Friday or that almost never 
announce on Friday (great part of the sample). In this way, the differences in unobservable 
characteristics that might exist between firms which consistently announce on Friday and firms 
which consistently announce on other days, are not considered. The earnings surprise measure 
is considerably more negative for Friday announcements in both samples, being the difference 
between Friday and non-Friday announcements statistically significant (at 1% level for the 
baseline sample and at 5% level for the homogeneous sample). This is the first evidence 
suggesting that firms tend to report worse than expected news on Fridays. Furthermore, firms 
announcing on Friday have, on average, 40% higher market capitalization than firms 
announcing on other weekday (+2,283$M). Moreover, Friday announcing firms have higher 
leverage (statistically significant difference at 5% level) and considerably lower book-to-
market ratio (statistically significant difference at 1% level). These differences invert for the 
homogeneous sample. Friday announcements are more predominant toward the end of the 
sample, with a difference in the average year of announcement of roughly two months and a 
half for the baseline sample, and ten months and a half for the homogeneous sample. Finally, 
for Friday announcements, 56.03% of the announcements occur in the first month of the quarter 
(January, April, July and October), 36.36% in the second month, and only 7.6% in the third 
month. Regarding non-Friday announcements there is a higher chance of occurring 
announcements in the first month of the quarter (58.23%). The differences in these variables 
are no longer statistically significant for the homogeneous sample. Table I-C presents average 
surprises by earnings surprise quantile for Friday and non-Friday announcements. The sample 
is divided into 11 earnings surprise quantiles9, determined by rank ordering earnings surprises 
                                                 
8 Approach suggested by DellaVigna and Pollet (2009). 
9 The relation between earnings surprise and announcement abnormal return is highly nonlinear, so the decile ranks 
of the earnings surprise are used, instead of the earnings surprise itself, reducing the influence of outliers. 
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each year. Quantiles 1 to 5 represent five quintiles of negative earnings surprises and quantiles 
7 to 11 represent five quintiles of positive earnings surprises. Quantile 6 contains 
announcements with earnings surprise equal to zero (100% forecast accuracy). The average 
surprises are identical throughout all quantiles for both Friday and non-Friday announcements, 
except for the bottom and top quantiles (1 and 11, respectively). Friday worst news (in relation 
to investor’s expectations) are more negative than non-Friday worst news, whereas Friday best 
news are more positive than non-Friday best news. It is also visible that there are significantly 
more positive earnings surprises than negative, as documented by Degeorge, Patel and 
Zeckhauser (1999).  
Table I 
Descriptive Statistics: Friday and Non-Friday Announcements 
Panel A exhibits the distribution of earnings announcements by weekday. Panel B exhibits descriptive statistics for the baseline 
sample (columns 1 and 2) and homogeneous sample (columns 4 and 5). Standard deviations are in parentheses. Columns 3 and 
6 exhibit the differences for the baseline and homogeneous samples, respectively, with standard errors for these mean differences 
in parentheses (*10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance). The homogeneous sample contains announcements 
of companies that announce at least 10% of the time on Friday and other weekdays. Panel C exhibits the average surprise by 
earnings surprise quantile for Friday and other weekdays' announcements. Negative surprises are in quantiles 1 to 5, positive 







(ℎ,𝐻)is the cumulative abnormal return from day ℎ to day 𝐻, in event time, for firm 
𝑖 in quarter 𝑞, 𝑑𝑖,𝑞
𝑡𝑜𝑝 is an indicator variable equal to one (zero) for observations in the top 
(bottom) quantile(s), and 𝑑𝑖,𝑞𝐹  is an indicator variable equal to one (zero) for Friday (non-Friday) 
announcements. The sample is restricted to observations only in the top or bottom quantiles, in 
order to measure the impact of extreme earnings news. The 𝛽𝑇−𝐵𝑁𝐹  coefficient measures the top-
to-bottom return differential for non-Friday announcements, while the 𝛽𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 coefficient 
captures the differential reaction for Friday announcements in relation to non-Friday 
announcements. To obtain results consistent with the Distraction Hypothesis, 𝛽𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 coefficient 
should be negative for the immediate response (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑞
(0,1)) and positive for the delayed response 
(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑞
(2,70)). Assuming that a large portion of the investor’s community is distracted on Fridays, 
it is expected the market to react less initially (underreact), and compensate later (overreact), 
since information will eventually be incorporated into stock prices. 
𝑋𝑖,𝑞 are control variables that can be included in certain regressions. More precisely, indicator 
variables for the year of announcement, month of announcement (common macroeconomic 
trends) and market capitalization decile (size) are included. The market capitalization measure 
is computed as the difference between the log market capitalization of firm 𝑖 in quarter 𝑞 and 
the average of the log market capitalization for other firms with announcements in the same 
exact quarter. The ranked announcements are assigned to one of ten decile portfolios on the 
basis of their announcer’s market capitalization. In some specifications, it is also controlled for 
earnings surprise volatility by including indicator variables for the surprise volatility deciles. 
The surprise volatility measure is the standard deviation of the firm’s earnings surprises during 
the four years preceding the announcement (minimum of four observations required). Then, 
earnings surprise volatility deciles are obtained by rank ordering surprise volatility each year. 
The cross products between the control variables and the indicator variable for the top (two) 
quantile are also included. Standard errors are clustered by announcement day to control for 
correlation of returns on the same weekday and adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
4.2.1. Immediate Response 
Table II-A presents specification (4), with the immediate abnormal response 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑞
(0,1) as the 
dependent variable. In columns 1 to 4, the sample is constrained to earnings news in the top or 
bottom quantiles. Regarding the specification without controls (column 1), the immediate top-
to-bottom return differential for non-Friday announcements is 6.85% (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝑁𝐹 =0.0685, significant 
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at 1% level). Relative to this value, the immediate stock return response for Friday 
announcements is 18% (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹/?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝑁𝐹 =0.0123/0.0685) lower, being marginally significantly 
smaller by 1.23 percentage points (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 = −0.0123, significant at 1% level). Adding the 
standard set of controls (month, year and market capitalization controls, in column 2), the 
Friday differential reaction is still negative and significant (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 = −0.0113, significant at 
5% level). Likewise, with additional surprise volatility controls (column 3), the 𝛽𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 
coefficient remains negatively significant (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 = −0.0100, significant at 5% level). Finally, 
in column 4, using a decile-based sorting procedure, the 𝛽𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 coefficient is still negatively 
significant (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 = −0.0084, significant at 10% level). In columns 5 to 8, the sample is 
constrained to earnings news in the top two or bottom two quantiles. This implies a larger 
sample, which naturally results in a higher precision of the estimates (considerably lowering 
standard errors of the estimates). For this sample (column 5), the immediate top-to-bottom 
return differential for non-Friday announcements is 6.09% (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝑁𝐹 =0.0609, significant at 1% 
level). Relative to this value, the immediate stock return response for Friday announcements is 
16.3% (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹/?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝑁𝐹 =0.0099/0.0609) lower, being marginally significantly smaller by 0.99 
percentage points (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 = −0.0099, significant at 1% level). This result is robust to the use 
of standard controls in column 6 (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 = −0.0090, significant at 1% level), additional 
surprise volatility controls in column 7 (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 = −0.0078, significant at 5% level), and the 
use of deciles as the sorting procedure in column 8 (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 = −0.0066, significant at 5% level).  
4.2.2. Delayed Response 
Table II-B reports specification (4), with the delayed abnormal performance 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑞
(2,70) as the 
dependent variable. Without controls (column 1), the delayed top-to-bottom return differential 
for non-Friday announcements, also known as post-earnings announcement drift, is 3.22% 
(?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝑁𝐹 =0.0322, significant at 1% level). Relative to this value, Friday announcements are 
associated with a 111% (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹/?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝑁𝐹 =0.0358/0.0322) higher drift, which is marginally 
significantly higher by 3.58 percentage points (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 =0.0358, significant at 5% level). 
Restricting the sample to earnings in the top two or bottom two quantiles, in column 5, the post-
earnings announcement drift for non-Friday announcements is 2.03% (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝑁𝐹 =0.0203, 
significant at 1% level). Relative to this value, Friday announcements are associated with a 
109% (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹/?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝑁𝐹 =0.0222/0.0203) higher drift, which is marginally significantly higher by 
2.22 percentage points (?̂?𝑇−𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 =0.0222, significant at 5% level). This Friday differential drift 
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is robust to the use of standard controls, additional surprise volatility controls, but not to the use 
of deciles as the sorting methodology, for both samples. 
To further investigate the phenomenon, Figure 2 presents the post-earnings announcement drift 
performance at various horizons, for Friday and non-Friday announcements. Drift is measured 
as the difference between the mean cumulative abnormal returns from day 2 to 𝑡 (horizon) for 
the top and bottom quantiles. The Friday differential drift only emerges 30 trading days after 
the announcement (except for the 20 trading days horizon, there is always a positive Friday 
differential drift). From then on, the Friday differential drift increases, until reaching its 
maximum 70 trading days after the announcement (justifies the horizon choice used to measure 
the delayed stock return response)10. After reaching its maximum, the drift for Friday 
announcements falls abruptly. This can be explained by the fact that 80 (or 90) trading days 
after the announcement we are already including the immediate abnormal return response to 
the next quarter earnings announcement, which, as highlighted before, is markedly ruled by 
under-reaction to earnings news.  
 
                                                 
10 Bernard and Thomas (1989) suggest that most of the drift takes place during the first 60 trading days following 
the announcement (3 calendar months). 
Figure 2 
Post-Earnings Announcement Drift at Various Horizons 
Drift is measured as the difference between the mean cumulative abnormal returns from day 2 to t 





































































































































































































































































































































































5. Event-Day 0: Adjustment for After-Hours Announcements 
After the application of DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) methodology, in this chapter, the 
implications of event date misspecification for the study here conducted are shown, and it is 
further analyzed the robustness of the Friday Distraction Hypothesis. Event dating accuracy is 
crucial for this type of study, in which the short-term market response to Friday earnings 
announcements is of great importance. An error of one day in the imputed announcement date 
completely distrusts the results. But more than the accuracy of the imputed announcement date, 
it is crucial to consider the time of the announcement because, in some situations, it is not 
correct to consider the announcement date as the event-day 0. For instance, when an 
announcement is made after-hours, the market reaction is only consummated on the next trading 
day, when the market reopens. For this reason, it is essential to adjust the event-day 0 for after-
hours announcements, otherwise, the immediate stock return response will capture the return 
for the day preceding the effective reaction. Specifically, the event-day 0 for after-market-close 
announcements is adjusted by adding one trading day to the announcement date. In this way, 
the main weakness in DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) research is addressed, regarding the 
negligence of the after-hours adjustment. Their inability to put this adjustment into practice, 
was due to the inexistence of information regarding the time of announcements when the study 
was conducted. To overcome this obstacle, they defined the immediate stock return reaction as 
the cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal return from day 0 to 1 (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑞
(0,1)), where day 0 is the 
date of announcement. This return window encompasses the immediate stock return reaction 
for both, before-market-close announcements (event-day 0), and after-market-close 
announcements (event-day 1). Fortunately, on April 2009, I/B/E/S started providing the exact 
time stamp of earnings announcements in its database. This announcement time variable goes 
back to January 199911, effectively allowing for the after-hours adjustment to be performed 
from this date onwards. Considering this, from the initial sample of earnings, a sub-sample 
adjusted for after-hours was created. To do so, the observations without time stamp were 
dropped and the sample was restricted to only include announcements posterior to January 
1999. The resulting sub-sample is composed of 124,370 observations. From this point onwards, 
the emphasis will lie on this sub-sample, in order to further investigate if, in fact, investors are 
more distracted on Fridays. Additionally, several analysis will be performed by time-of-the-day 
                                                 
11 The time stamp in I/B/E/S detail file goes back to 1998, however, the time stamp for announcements made 
before 1999 concerns the activation time (the time at which Thomson Reuters recorded the announcement), rather 




the period of adaptation to new legislation contributed the most for the decrease in during-

















Announcement Time Distribution (January, 1999-September, 2014) 
Trading hours are from 9:30 to 16:00 EST. 
Figure 4 
Monthly Proportion of During-Trading and Evening Announcements  
(January, 1999-September, 2014) 












Earnings Surprise and Earnings Announcement Return in Relation to Announcement Time 
The sub-sample adjusted for after-hours announcements is divided into three groups of firms: firms that only announce 
BMC; firms that only announce AMC; and firms that announce both BMC and AMC. This Table presents average 
earnings surprise, and average three-day abnormal announcement returns by earnings surprise quintiles for these three 
groups of firms. Differences are reported in columns 5 and 6. Standard errors are in parentheses (*10% significance, 




After finding evidence supporting the idea that the market reacts differently for BMC and AMC 
announcements, in Table IV, are presented the implications of not adjusting the event-day 0 for 
after-hours announcements. Therefore, the initial sample (where event-day 0 is the 
announcement date), subject of analysis throughout chapter 4, is compared with the sub-sample 
adjusted for after-hours (where event-day 0 is adjusted for after-hours announcements). Table 
IV-A, reports size-adjusted abnormal returns around earnings announcements from event-day 
-1 through event-day 1, for the initial sample (columns 1 to 3) and the sub-sample adjusted for 
after-hours (columns 4 to 6) across five earnings surprise portfolios. For the initial sample, a 
large part of the return response is concentrated on event-days 0 and 1, as expected. Event-day 
0 is responsible for 41% (averaged over all quintiles) of the total return response from event-
day -1 through event-day 1, while event-day 1 is responsible for 54%. With the adjustment for 
after-hours announcements, a great share of the return response is shifted from event-day 1 to 
event-day 0 (return differences for days 0 and 1 are statistically significant across all quintiles). 
In the sub-sample adjusted for after-hours announcements, the return response is concentrated 
on event-day 0, which is now responsible for 84% of the total return response from event-day 
-1 through event-day 1, while event-day 1 is responsible for only 14%.  
In turn, Table IV-B presents the abnormal volume response around earnings announcements, 
from event-day -1 through event-day 1. Abnormal volume on trading day 𝑡  is defined as the 
difference between the actual share volume on that trading day and the daily share volume 
averaged over the preannouncement period from event-day -30 through event-day -11, divided 
by that same average. Similarly to return-related results, once the event dates are adjusted for 
after-hours announcements, there is a shift of a great share of the abnormal volume response 
from event-day 1 to event-day 0. In this case, 63% of the total abnormal volume response occurs 
on event-day 0 (in relation to 40% for the initial sample), whereas only 26% occurs on event-







































































































































































































































































































































to other times of the day). This behavior seems to be consistent with the Opportunism 
Hypothesis but it is not a certainty.  
 
5.3.2. Stock Return Response: Graphical Evidence 
In this sub-section, it is presented graphical evidence measuring the responsiveness of stock 
market returns to earnings announcement news, by time-of-the-day intervals (morning, during-
trading and evening). The sample is divided into 11 earnings surprise quantiles, as in chapter 4. 
Quantiles are determined by rank ordering earnings surprises each year, separately for each 
time-of-the-day sub-sample.  
5.3.2.1. Immediate Response 
The immediate stock return response is measured by the mean one-day abnormal announcement 
return adjusted for after-hours announcements. As presented by the graphical evidence in 
Figure 5c, concerning evening announcements, the market reacts less negatively to bad earnings 
news (quantiles 1 to 5) and less positively to good earnings news (quantiles 7 to 11), for Friday 
evening announcements, consistent with the Immediate Under-Reaction Sub-Hypothesis. 
Table V 
Friday and Non-Friday Announcements at Different Periods of the Day 
This table reports the differences between Friday and other weekdays’ announcements in average earnings 
surprises, mean one-day announcement returns, and fraction of positive earnings surprises for the whole sub-
sample and by time-of-the-day intervals (morning, during-trading and evening). T-statistics for the differences are 











𝐹 +  𝛽𝑇
𝑁𝐹𝑑𝑖,𝑞
𝑡𝑜𝑝 +  Γ𝑋𝑖,𝑞 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑞 ,  (8) 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑞 is the abnormal announcement return for company 𝑖 in quarter 𝑞. 𝑑𝑖,𝑞
𝑡𝑜𝑝(𝑑𝑖,𝑞
𝑏𝑜𝑡) is an 
indicator variable equal to one for observations in the top (bottom) two earnings surprise 
quantiles, and zero for observations in the bottom (top) two earnings surprise quantiles. 𝑑𝑖,𝑞𝐹  is 
an indicator variable equal to one (zero) for Friday (non-Friday) announcements. Instead of 
𝑑𝑖,𝑞
𝑡𝑜𝑝(𝑑𝑖,𝑞
𝑏𝑜𝑡), in some regressions, I use 𝑑𝑖,𝑞
𝑝𝑜𝑠(𝑑𝑖,𝑞
𝑛𝑒𝑔
), which is an indicator variable for positive 
(negative) news. This alternative allows for a wider use of the sample. Moreover, several 
controls can be included in specification (8). Namely, indicator variables for the year of 
announcement, month of announcement, as well as, industry and firm fixed effects15. However, 
the use of these controls does not rule out the hypothesis that some omitted variables could 
explain the results. 
5.3.3.1. Immediate Response  
Table VI-A reproduces DellaVigna and Pollet’s (2009) results for the immediate stock return 
response, but instead of using the two-day buy-and-hold abnormal return, 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑞
(0,1),  as the 
dependent variable (replicated in chapter 4), the one-day abnormal announcement return 
adjusted for after-hours announcements is used. For the results to be consistent with the 
Immediate Under-Reaction Sub-Hypothesis, it is expected a negative (positive) coefficient for 
the 𝑑𝑖,𝑞
𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑖,𝑞
𝐹 (𝑑𝑖,𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑞𝐹 ) cross-term. For the total sample (column 1), there is a significant Friday 
reduced reaction to negative news (bottom two quantiles), but the reduced reaction to positive 
news (top two quantiles) is only marginally significant (10% p-value threshold). In response to 
good news, Friday is associated with a reduced immediate reaction, compared to other 
weekdays, for all time-of-the-day intervals (columns 2 to 4), but the coefficients for the morning 
and during-trading groups are too small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. In turn, 
there is a largely significant Friday reduced immediate reaction to positive news for evening 
announcements (?̂?𝑇𝐹−𝑁𝐹 = −0.0152, significant at 1% level). Similarly, the Friday differential 
immediate reaction to negative news is only positive and largely significant for evening 
announcements (?̂?𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 = 0.0152, significant at 1% level). The results are rather similar using 
almost all observations (columns 5 to 8). For the total sample (column 5), there is a significant 
Friday reduced immediate reaction to negative news, but the reduced reaction to positive news 
                                                 
15 Industry and firm fixed effects are introduced using the Least Squares Dummy Variable method. 
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is not significant. Finally, there is a largely significant Friday reduced immediate reaction to 
positive and negative news, exclusively for evening announcements (?̂?𝑝𝑜𝑠𝐹−𝑁𝐹 = −0.0094, 
significant at 1% level; ?̂?𝑛𝑒𝑔𝐹−𝑁𝐹 = 0.0119, significant at 1% level).  
In sum, Friday evening announcements are associated with a substantial reduced immediate 
reaction to both positive and negative news relative to other weekdays’ evening 
announcements, consistent with graphical findings from the previous sub-section. The same 
does not verify for morning and during-trading announcements. Therefore, there is striking 
evidence indicating that Friday evening announcements are the only responsible for the well-
documented immediate under-reaction to Friday earnings announcements. Only the results for 
the evening group are consistent with the Immediate Under-Reaction Sub-Hypothesis. The 
under-reaction to Friday evening announcements here documented cannot be explained by 
Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh’s (2009) notion of distraction, implying that extraneous news distract 
investors, causing market prices to underreact to relevant news. There are relatively few 
earnings announced on Friday evenings, so investors are not likely to get distracted from a 
specific firm’s announcement, since there are no relevant competing information signals to 
draw investor’s attention away.  
5.3.3.2. Delayed Response 
Table VI-B reproduces DellaVigna and Pollet’s (2009) results for the delayed stock return 
response, measured by the cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal return from day 2 to 70, in event 
time, where event-day 0 is adjusted for after-hours announcements. For the results to be 
consistent with the Delayed Overreaction Sub-Hypothesis, it is expected a positive (negative) 
coefficient for the 𝑑𝑖,𝑞
𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑖,𝑞
𝐹 (𝑑𝑖,𝑞𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑞𝐹 ) cross-term. For the total sample (columns 1 and 5), there 
is no evidence supporting the Delayed Overreaction Sub-Hypothesis, except for the increased 
reaction to negative news (bottom two quantiles) on Fridays, in column 1, which is only 
marginally significant (10% p-value threshold). Segmenting the analysis by time-of-the-day 
intervals, it is possible to conclude that Friday evening announcements are the only ones 
contributing to this overreaction to negative news. The Friday differential delayed response to 
negative news (bottom two quantiles) is negative and marginally significant for evening 
announcements (?̂?𝐵𝐹−𝑁𝐹 = −0.0352, significant at 10% level). Using almost all observations, 
Friday evening announcements are still associated with an increased delayed reaction 
(overreaction) compared to other weekdays’ evening announcements, in response to negative 
news (?̂?𝑛𝑒𝑔𝐹−𝑁𝐹 = −0.0276, significant at 5% level).  
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In conclusion, Friday evening announcements are associated with a significant increased 
delayed response to negative news relative to other weekdays’ evening announcements, 
consistent with the Delayed Overreaction Sub-Hypothesis. However, the same does not verify 
for positive earnings surprises, possibly because rational arbitrageurs have an incentive to 
exploit this market inefficiency. 
5.3.4. Introduction of Controls for Evening Announcements 
In this sub-section, it is analyzed whether the regression results for evening announcements are 
robust after controlling for month of announcement, year of announcement, industry fixed 
effects and firm fixed effects. Table VI-C presents these results for the immediate stock return 
response. With the introduction of month and year controls, the interaction between the Friday 
indicator and the top (bottom) two quantiles indicator is still negative (positive) and significant 
at the 5% p-value threshold (column 1). This also verifies when using indicator variables for 
positive and negative news (column 2). The results are also robust to the introduction of industry 
fixed effects16, since the cross-terms in analysis remain significant, and consistent with the 
Immediate Under-Reaction Sub-Hypothesis (columns 3 and 4). After controlling for firm fixed 
effects17, the cross-term measuring the Friday differential response to good news loses its 
significance for the regression using the top and bottom earnings news (column 5), but is still 
marginally significant, at the 10% p-value threshold, for the regression using almost all 
observations (column 6). In turn, the cross-term measuring the Friday differential response to 
bad news remains positive and statistically significant at the 5% p-value threshold for both 
regressions. Finally, for the regressions with all controls (columns 7 and 8), Friday evening 
announcements are still associated with a significant reduced immediate reaction to negative 
news relative to other weekdays’ evening announcements (significant at 5% p-value threshold 
for both regressions). The same does not apply in response to positive news, since the cross-
term measuring the Friday differential response is no longer significant for the regression using 
top and bottom observations, and is only marginally significant at the 10% p-value threshold 
for the regression using almost all observations. Unreported results concerning the effect of 
adding controls on the delayed stock return response for evening announcements, show that the 
delayed overreaction to negative news associated with Friday evening announcements is not 
robust after controlling for industry and firm fixed effects. Inconsistent with the attention-based 
                                                 
16 Industry fixed effects are introduced using the INDNAM variable from I/B/E/S database. 
17 Firm fixed effects are introduced using the PERMNO variable from CRSP database. 
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explanation defended by DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), firm heterogeneity seems to explain the 
Friday (evening) effect, except the immediate stock return under-reaction to negative earnings 
news. 
Irrational trading by noise investors is a reasonable explanation for the documented under-
reaction to Friday evening negative news that persists even after the introduction of controls. 
Noise traders are usually net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks following an earnings 
announcement (Lee, 1992; Barber & Odean, 2008), possibly due to short-sale constraints, and 
also because they rely heavily on recommendations issued by analysts and brokers, which are 
strongly one-sided (Groth et al., 1979). Lee (1992) provides evidence that small noise traders 
are net buyers following both positive and negative earnings surprises (Hirshleifer et al., 2008; 
Lamont & Frazzini, 2007). As a result, this generates an upward price bias, strengthening the 
reaction to positive surprises and weakening the reaction to negative surprises. The premise for 
this assumption is that there is more time for slow noise traders to accumulate orders over the 
weekend18. Alternatively, announcement delay can also be a valid explanation for the 
immediate under-reaction to Friday evening negative news. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 
(2005) present survey evidence that managers frequently delay the announcement of bad news, 
giving managers the opportunity to anticipate it. Consistent with this, Bagnoli, Clement and 
Watts (2005) find that Friday bad news are at least in part anticipated by investors. They present 
evidence of price declines in the two days prior to these announcements, which are not corrected 
in the following days, implying that investors are anticipating the earnings news rather than 
being distracted. Furthermore, Friday announcements are intrinsically different from non-
Friday announcements, given the two-day halt in trading following Fridays. Orders accumulate 
over the weekend flooding the market on Monday. Overwhelmed investors on Monday may 
not have the time to react appropriately to Friday earnings announcements, which can explain 




                                                 
18 Dey and Radhakrishna (2007) provide evidence that sophisticated institutions react quickly and aggressively in 
the immediate aftermath of an announcement, whereas slow and overconfident individual investors take more time 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.3.6. Volume Response: Absolute News 
To quantify the graphical evidence from the previous sub-section, the following model is 
estimated, 
𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑞  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽
𝐹𝑑𝑖,𝑞
𝐹 + 𝛽𝐹,𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐸𝑆𝑄𝑖,𝑞𝑑𝑖,𝑞
𝐹 +  𝛽𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐸𝑆𝑄𝑖,𝑞 +  Γ𝑋𝑖,𝑞 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑞,  (9) 
where 𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑞 is the abnormal announcement volume for company 𝑖 in quarter 𝑞, 𝑑𝑖,𝑞𝐹  is an 
indicator variable equal to one (zero) for Friday (non-Friday) announcements, and 𝑋𝑖,𝑞 are firm 
fixed effects. The absolute earnings surprise quantile, 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐸𝑆𝑄𝑖,𝑞, is also included in Equation 
(8). This variable, inspired in the volume regressions from Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009), 
is expressed as |𝐸𝑆𝑄𝑖,𝑞 −  6|, where 𝐸𝑆𝑄𝑖,𝑞 is the earnings surprise quantile. It assumes the 
highest values for extreme positive and negative news, which are susceptible to generate more 
trading volume. The 𝛽𝐸𝑆 coefficient measures the abnormal volume increase for each one-
quantile increase in the 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐸𝑆𝑄𝑖,𝑞 variable, for non-Friday announcements. This coefficient is 
expected to be positive, since greater earnings surprises are susceptible to capture more market 
attention and, consequently, generate more trading. However, the variable of interest to test the 
Friday effect is the 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐸𝑆𝑄𝑖,𝑞𝑑𝑖,𝑞𝐹  cross-term, which captures the differential abnormal volume 
reaction for Friday announcements relative to non-Friday announcements. For the results to be 
consistent with the Immediate Under-Reaction Sub-Hypothesis, it is expected a lower abnormal 
volume response for Friday announcements compared to other weekdays’ announcements, 
implying that the 𝛽𝐹,𝐸𝑆 coefficient should be negative. Table VII presents regression results for 
the total sample and the morning, during-trading and evening sub-samples. First, it is estimated 
the model without controls (columns 1 to 4) and, afterwards, firm heterogeneity is accounted 
for by introducing firm fixed effects into the model (columns 5 to 8). Without controls, the 𝛽𝐸𝑆 
coefficient is positive and largely significant for the total sample and all time-of-the-day 
intervals. The 𝛽𝐹,𝐸𝑆 coefficient is negative and largely significant, at the 1% p-value threshold, 
for the total sample and all time-of-the-day intervals, with special emphasis on evening 
announcements. For each one-quantile increase in 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐸𝑆𝑄𝑖,𝑞, abnormal volume increases by 
56 percentage points, for non-Friday evening announcements (𝛽𝐸𝑆 =0.5636). Comparatively 
to this value, the abnormal volume reaction in response to the same increase, for Friday evening 
announcements, is marginally significantly smaller by 44 percentage points (𝛽𝐹,𝐸𝑆 = −0.4363). 
In this case, contrary to return-related findings from previous sections, the negative Friday 
differential volume reaction is a phenomenon present in all time-of-the-day intervals, not 
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exclusive to evening announcements. After controlling for firm fixed effects, the Friday effect 
is completely dissipated for the total sample and all time-of-the-day intervals. This means that 
the negative Friday (evening) differential volume reaction is explained by the different 
characteristics of firms announcing on Fridays relative to other weekdays, rather than by 




































































































































































































































































































associated coefficients are expected to be negative. The coefficients for the timing variables in 
the separate models, are significantly negative for the Friday and AMC models, but only 
marginally significant for the busy days’ model. The unconditional earnings surprise average 
is -0.00046, or -0.046% of price. Considering the timing decisions simultaneously, without 
controls (column 4), the coefficients associated with 𝐹𝑅𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑖,𝑞 and 𝐴𝑀𝐶𝑖,𝑞 variables are 
significantly negative, whereas the coefficient associated with the 𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑖,𝑞 variable is 
significantly positive. The earnings surprise measure tends to be 360% (𝛽𝐹
𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅
=  −0.0017/
−0.00046) worse on Fridays than average and 183% (𝛽𝐴𝑀𝐶
𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅
=  −0.0009/−0.00046) worse 
after-market-close than average, consistent with the Opportunism Hypothesis. This behavior 
seems to be consistent with the Opportunism Hypothesis, but the reason why managers tend to 
report worse news on Fridays and after-hours may not be driven by opportunistic motivations. 
A fair share of the managers may schedule the release of bad earnings news after-hours and/or 
on Fridays, only to allow the market to have more time to process the information (Assimilation 
Hypothesis). 
These findings seem to support the idea that there is lower market attention during Fridays and 
after-hours, especially on Friday evenings. However, it can be only a matter of perception, since 
managers may perceive attention to be reduced on Fridays and after-hours, but in the end, 
investors do not exhibit inattention. A reasonable explanation for the positive 𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑖,𝑞 
coefficient is that, mangers may not be able, beforehand, to distinguish with precision a high 
information flow day (busy reporting day) from a low information flow day (quite reporting 
day), and thus, they are not able to accurately time the earnings releases according to this 
variable. The other alternative explanation, is that managers may not perceive high information 
flow days as to be high inattention days, simply because earnings season is a highly anticipated 
period, giving investors appropriate time to organize themselves. After controlling for month, 
year, industry fixed effects and firm fixed effects (column 5), it is obtained marginally 
significant results for the 𝐹𝑅𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑖,𝑞 variable, implying that the controls put in place explain 





6. Concluding Remarks 
After replicating DellaVigna and Pollet’s (2009) methodology, the results obtained are 
consistent with their findings for my sample period (January, 1995 to September, 2014). Friday 
announcements are associated with a 16.3% to 18% lower immediate stock return response, 
and a 109% to 111% higher delayed stock return response (post-earnings announcement drift), 
compared to other weekdays. These results are robust to the use of standard controls (year, 
month and size), and additional surprise volatility controls. Regarding delayed response ratios, 
44.87% to 53.45% of the total stock return response to Friday announcements comes with a 
delay, against 24.20% to 30.84% for non-Friday announcements.  
In chapter 5, are highlighted the implications of event date misspecification, resulting from the 
negligence of the after-hours adjustment. Once proven the importance of this adjustment for a 
study of this nature, it is addressed the main weakness in DellaVigna and Pollet’s (2009) 
research, which has precisely to do with the negligence of the after-hours adjustment. More 
specifically, the event-day 0 is adjusted for after-market-close announcements by adding one 
trading day to the announcement date. Using this more precise measure of the stock return 
response to earnings news, it was further investigated the robustness of the Friday Distraction 
Hypothesis across different time-of-the-day intervals (morning, during-trading and evening), 
from January 1999 to September 2014. Regression analyses indicate that, for the total sample, 
Table VIII 
Strategic Timing of Earnings Announcements 
This Table presents results of regressing earnings surprise on each timing variable (columns 1 to 3), and on 
all timing variables, without and with controls (columns 4 and 5, respectively). Friday, AMC, and EAFREQ 
are used as timing (explanatory) variables. Controls are month of announcement, year of announcement, 
industry fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses (*10% significance, **5% 
significance, ***1% significance). 
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there is a significant Friday reduced immediate reaction to negative news in relation to other 
weekdays, but the reduced reaction to positive news is not significant. Segmenting the analysis 
by time-of-the-day intervals, there is a largely significant Friday reduced immediate reaction to 
both positive and negative earnings news, exclusively for evening announcements. Therefore, 
there is striking evidence indicating that Friday evening announcements are the only 
responsible for the immediate under-reaction to Friday earnings announcements. Regarding the 
delayed response, for the total sample, there is no evidence supporting the Delayed 
Overreaction Sub-Hypothesis, except for the increased reaction to negative news (bottom two 
quantiles) on Fridays, which is only marginally significant. Segmenting the analysis by time-
of-the-day intervals, it is possible to conclude that Friday evening announcements are the only 
ones contributing to this overreaction to negative news. In sum, Friday evening earnings news 
travel slowly than other weekdays’ evening news. After the introduction of controls, regression 
results indicate that firm heterogeneity explains the immediate under-reaction to positive 
earnings news associated with Friday evening announcements. However, the immediate under-
reaction to negative earnings news remains robust, consistent with the Immediate Under-
Reaction Sub-Hypothesis. Unreported results, show that the delayed overreaction to negative 
earnings news associated with Friday evening announcements is not robust after controlling for 
industry and firm fixed effects.  
According to volume graphical findings, the abnormal announcement volume response is 32 
percentage points smaller for Friday announcements (139% abnormal volume) compared to 
other weekdays’ announcements (171% abnormal volume), further corroborating the Friday 
Distraction Hypothesis. According to regression analysis, the differential abnormal volume 
reaction for Friday announcements relative to non-Friday announcements is negative and 
largely significant, for the total sample and all time-of-the-day intervals, with special emphasis 
on evening announcements. For each one-quantile increase in 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝐸𝑆𝑄𝑖,𝑞 variable, abnormal 
volume increases by 56 percentage points, for non-Friday evening announcements. 
Comparatively to this value, the abnormal volume reaction in response to the same increase, 
for Friday evening announcements, is marginally significantly smaller by 44 percentage points. 
In this case, contrary to return-related findings, the negative Friday differential volume reaction 
is a phenomenon present in all time-of-the-day intervals, not exclusive to evening 
announcements. After controlling for firm fixed effects, the Friday effect is completely 
dissipated for the total sample and all time-of-the-day intervals. This means that the negative 
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Friday (evening) differential volume reaction is explained by the different characteristics of 
firms announcing on Fridays relative to other weekdays, rather than by investor inattention.  
Also in this chapter, it is presented evidence that the earnings surprise measure tends to be 360% 
worse on Fridays than the unconditional average, and 183% worse after-market-close than the 
same average, consistent with the Opportunism Hypothesis. The same does not apply to busy 
reporting days. After controlling for month, year, industry and firm fixed effects, the results 
obtained for the 𝐹𝑅𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑖,𝑞 variable are only marginally significant, implying that the controls 
put in place explain the managers’ propensity to report worse news after-hours. Additional 
research is warranted to explore alternative explanations for these empirical regularities, as well 
as, to corroborate or disprove its strategic nature. 
The main finding of this study is that the well-documented differential market reaction to Friday 
earnings news (DellaVigna & Pollet, 2009) is, in fact, a phenomenon only valid for evening 
announcements. After controlling for other possible determinants of this effect, there is striking 
evidence indicating that the Friday evening effect is driven by non-attention causes, being 
largely attributed to firm heterogeneity, except for the immediate stock return under-reaction to 
negative earnings news. In sum, the Friday Distraction Hypothesis does not hold19. Further 
investigation in this field is welcome to shed light on which firm characteristics are responsible 
for the Friday evening effect, as well as, on the reasons behind the persistent immediate stock 








                                                 
19 DeHaan, Shevlin and Thornock (2015) do not find lower attention on Fridays as well. They also theorize that 
investor distraction on Fridays is inconsistent with the typical work patterns for an investment banker, analyst, or 
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